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Introduction
In May of 1998, India initiated three nuclear weapons tests.' Pakistan
quickly followed India's lead and responded with its own series of nuclear
weapons tests on May 28, 1998.2 India claims its development of nuclear
weapons was a critical step towards protecting its national security,
because it deters a possible Chinese or Pakistani nuclear invasion of Indian
territory.3 Pointing to its half-century history of wars against both Pakistan
and China,4 India contends that the United States' refusal to intervene in
China's ongoing transfer of nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan left
India with no other option but to develop nuclear weaponry. 5
The United States had hoped its guarantee to impose economic sanc-
tions upon states that seek and acquire nuclear arms would deter India
and Pakistan from developing nuclear weaponry.6 U.S. politicians rely on
economic sanctions statutes, such as the Arms Export Control Act, 7 as an
alternative to the use of force, because they enable the United States to take
1. John F. Burns, India Sets 3 Nuclear Blasts, Defying a Worldwide Ban; Tests Bring a
Sharp Outcry, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1998, at Al; KennethJ. Cooper, India Sets Off Nuclear
Devices; Pakistan Vents Outrage Over Test Explosions, Delhi's First Since '74, WASH. POST,
May 12, 1998, at Al.
2. SeeJohn F. Burns, Nuclear Anxiety: The Overview; Pakistan, Answering India, Car-
ries Out Nuclear Tests; Clinton's Appeal Rejected, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1998, at Al; Farhan
Bokhari et al., Pakistan Resists U.S. Pressure Over Nuclear Test, FIN. TIMES (London), May
16, 1998, at 1.
3. The last half-century has not been a peaceful era for the South Asia region. Since
gaining its independence in 1947, India has engaged in three wars against Pakistan and
one war against China. Needless to say, India has had hostile relations with both Paki-
stan and China. There is mounting evidence, however, that Pakistan and China col-
luded with one another to develop Pakistan's nuclear weapons. If Pakistan successfully
obtained nuclear weaponry, then India would be the only nation of the three not to have
a nuclear arsenal. See Adam Packer, Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia, 38 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 631, 634-39 (2000).
4. India and Pakistan engaged in border dispute wars over the Kashmir region dur-
ing 1947-48, 1965, and 1971. SUMIT GANGULY, THE ORIGINS OF WAR IN SOUTH ASIA: INDO-
PAKISTANI CONFLICTS SINCE 1947, at 15-47 (2d ed. 1994). India unsuccessfully battled
China in 1962. INDIA AND THE BOMB: PUBLIC OPINIONS AND NUCLEAR OPTIONS 8-12 (David
Cortright & Amitabh Mattoo eds., 1996) [hereinafter INDIA AND THE BOMB]. See generally
STEVEN HOFFMANN, INDIA AND THE CHINA CRISIS (1990).
5. See Jaswant Singh, Against Nuclear Apartheid, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 1998, at
46. But see John Goshko & William Branigan, U.S. Warns China of Sanctions for Missile
Exports to Pakistan, WASH. POST, July 26, 1993, at A10; Steven Greenhouse, $1 Billion in
Sales of High-Tech Items to China Blocked, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1993, at Al; Steven A.
Holmes, U.S. Determines China Violated Pact on Missiles, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1993, at
Al; Lally Weymouth, Chinese Take-Out, Supplying Weapons to Rogue States, WASH. POST,
Aug. 12, 1993, at A27; and Daniel Williams, U.S. Punishes China Over Missile Sales,
WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 1993, at Al.
6. See India-Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Asia
and the Pacific of the House Committee on International Relations, 105th Cong. (1998)
[hereinafter India-Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation]. There are some reports that in 1990
South Asia was much closer to a nuclear war than the U.S.-U.S.S.R. standoff during the
Cuban Missile Crisis. Indian officials have denied that such a nuclear crisis ever
existed, but a retired Indian official has revealed that India was extremely concerned
about a nuclear battle with Pakistan during the spring of 1990. See Seymour Hersh, On
the Nuclear Edge, THE NEW YORKER, March 29, 1993, at 56-73.
7. Arms Export Control Act of 1978 § 102, 22 U.S.C.S. 2799aa-1 (2000).
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a firm stand against uncooperative or rogue foreign governments without
paying the high costs and suffering the loss of human life that armed con-
flict entails.8 Prior to India and Pakistan's 1998 nuclear tests, the United
States enacted the Arms Export Control Act to deter the international
spread of nuclear weapon technology by guaranteeing the immediate impo-
sition of U.S. sanctions upon any state that sought and obtained nuclear
weapon capabilities. 9 Both India and Pakistan were aware of these sanc-
tions and the ramifications of their nuclear weapons tests, but both nations
chose to upgrade their nuclear weapon capabilities. Their decision to
acquire nuclear weapons, knowing what consequences would follow, illus-
trates that the Arms Export Control Act sanctions does not sufficiently
deter nations from acquiring nuclear weaponry. 10
Economic sanctions are highly controversial foreign policy tools,
which have been the target of an enormous amount of criticism, research,
and negative publicity.1 1 Congress has examined the effectiveness of eco-
nomic sanctions and proposed several bills to reform and improve their
effectiveness as foreign policy tools.1 2 This Note examines the Arms
Export Control Act's anti-proliferation sanctions and considers whether or
not the proposed legislation will make economic sanctions a more effective
tool in the United States' battle to limit the proliferation of nuclear technol-
ogy. Specifically, Part I of this Note provides a brief description and back-
ground on the United States' use of economic sanctions. Part II outlines
the Arms Export Control Act and discusses the U.S. response to India's and
Pakistan's nuclear weapons tests. Part III then examines the recent Con-
gressional and executive branch proposals for sanctions reform legislation.
Applying the proposals to the India-Pakistan nuclear testing crisis, Part IV
8. "Sanctions can offer a nonmilitary alternative to the terrible options of war or
indifference when confronted with aggression or injustice." ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 2 (Richard N. Haass ed., 1998); Hearings on Sanctions Reform:
Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 106th Cong. 98 (1999) (state-
ment of Christopher J. Dodd, U.S. Senate) [hereinafter Hearings on Sanctions Reform].
9. 22 U.S.C.S. 2799aa-1 (2000).
10. See Economic Sanctions and U.S. Policy Interests: Hearing Before the House Commit-
tee on International Relations, 105th Congress 94 (1998) [hereinafter Economic Sanctions
and U.S. Policy Interests] (statement of Stuart E. Eizenstat, Under Secretary of State)
("That both countries chose to go forward with their decisions to test, knowing full well
the monumental consequences, underscores that ultimately sanctions may not deter
nations from actions that they view . . . as fundamental to their national security
concerns.").
11. See generally ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: PANACEA OR PEACEBUILDING IN A POST-COLD
WAR WORLD? (David Cortright and George A. Lopez eds., 1995) [hereinafter PANACEA OR
PEACEBUILDING]; ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, supra note 8; GARY
CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: HISTORY AND CURRENT POL-
ICY (1985) [hereinafter ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED]; LISA L. MARTIN & JEFFREY
LAURENTI, THE UNITED NATIONS AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: IMPROVING REGIME EFFECTIVE-
NESS (United Nations Association of the United States of America, 1997); J. DAVID RICH-
ARDSON, SIZING Up U.S. EXPORT DISINCENTIVES (1993).
12. E.g., The Sanctions Rationalization Act of 1999, S. 927, 106th Cong. (1999); The
Economic Sanctions Reform Act of 1999, S. 1161, 106th Cong. (1999); The Sanctions
Policy Reform Act, S. 757, 106th Cong. (1999); The Enhancement of Trade, Security, &
Human Rights Through Sanctions Reform Act, H.R. 1244, 106th Cong. (1999).
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argues that the Bush Administration must continue the U.S. sanctions
reform movement and push for more significant changes within U.S. sanc-
tions policy to make these foreign policy tools more effective at preventing
the spread of nuclear technology and capabilities. Finally, Part V offers
specific recommendations to the Bush Administration on how to improve
the effectiveness of the Arms Export Control Act sanctions.
1. The Use of Economic Sanctions
A. What Are Economic Sanctions?
Economic sanctions are "coercive foreign policy action[s] . .. [that] inten-
tionally suspend customary economic relations such as trade and/or finan-
cial exchanges in order to prompt the targeted nation to change its policy
or behavior."'13 Experts consider sanctions to be intermediate-level foreign
policy tools, since they cost less than armed force, but amount to more
than just diplomatic relations.' 4 Sanctions also communicate a stronger
message to foreign states than other foreign policy measures, such as termi-
nating communication or diplomatic relations, because they exert financial
costs on the target state. 15 Sanctions can take many forms including the
following: export controls, 16 reduced aid from U.S. government programs,
import restrictions, 17 limitations on loans from U.S. private financial insti-
tutions, and the denial of support for loans from international financial
institutions. t8 And unless a treaty specifies otherwise, most economic
sanctions do not violate customary international law.19
The United States issues economic sanctions against target countries
for a variety of purposes. In the past, the United States has issued sanc-
13. PANACEA OR PEACEBUILDING, supra note 11, at 15 n.3.
14. "There are.., three tools in foreign policy: diplomacy, sanctions, and war. Take
away sanctions and how can the United States deal with terrorists, proliferators, and
genocidal dictators? Our options would be empty talk or sending in the marines. With-
out sanctions, the United States would be virtually powerless to influence events absent
war." Jesse Helms, What Sanctions Epidemic? U.S. Business' Curious Crusade, FOREIGN
AFF., Jan/Feb. 1999, at 5.
15. See Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard
U.S. Legal Regime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1162, 1163 (1987).
16. Export controls limit the quantity of goods and services that American busi-
nesses can sell to the target country. See Raj Bhala, Mrs. Watu: Seven Steps to Trade
Sanctions Analysis, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 565, 574 (1999) [hereinafter Mrs. Watu].
17. Import restrictions limit the quantity of goods and services that the U.S. may
purchase from the target country. See id.
18. Carter, supra note 15, at 1164.
19. Sanctions that deny monetary assistance or government funding to a target
country are legal, as customary international law does not require one state to provide
monetary assistance to a foreign nation. AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 4-5 (Peter Malanczuk ed., 7th ed. 1997); Carter, supra note 15, at 1167 n.12
("The frequent use of ... sanctions by many countries constitutes persuasive evidence
that no clear norm exists against them in customary international law."). But see Farer,
Political and Economic Coercion in Contemporary International Law, 79 AM.J. INT'L L. 405,
411-13 (1985).
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tions to promote human rights,20 to produce governmental change, 2 1 to
protect the environment,2 2 to combat narcotics trafficking, to end terror-
ism,2 3 and to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons.2 4 Economic sanc-
tions achieve these purposes by inducing the target country to alter its
behavior, policies, or government; by punishing the target country for its
policies; and by sending a message to all other nations considering similar
behavior.25
The United States imposes economic sanctions through a number of
governmental actions. First, the President can impose sanctions based on
powers granted to him or her under existing federal statutes or by exercis-
ing his or her constitutional power to issue Executive Orders.26 Second,
Congress can implement sanctions by enacting public laws that gain the
President's support or, without the President's support, by overriding his
or her veto.2 7 Third, the United States may issue sanctions pursuant to a
United Nations Security Council Resolution.2 8 Finally, and most contro-
versially, state or local governments may impose sanctions against foreign
entities.2 9
B. U.S. Historical Account of Economic Sanctions
Economic sanctions are not native to the United States, 30 but they have
20. Following the Tiananmen Square violence in 1989, the United States imposed
sanctions against China in an attempt to induce China to cease its human rights viola-
tions. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, supra note 8, at 6.
21. The Reagan and Bush administrations imposed economic sanctions against
Burma, Haiti, Somalia, Sudan, Suriname, and Iraq to advocate democracy and oppose
these countries' extensive human rights violations. See Adam Smith, A High Price to Pay:
The Costs of the U.S. Economic Sanctions Policy and the Need for Process Oriented Reform, 4
U.C.L.A.J. INT'L L & FOR. AFF. 325, 333 n.29 (1999) (citing ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECON-
SIDERED, supra note 11, at 7 (1985)).
22. The United States has imposed sanctions to oppose China's construction of the
Three Gorges Dam, to ban the importation of wildlife from Taiwan, and to outlaw the
importation of shrimp from nations that do not require fisherman to use turtle excluder
devices in their shrimp nets. Id. at 334 n.35.
23. The United States issued sanctions against Libya in response to the 1988 bomb-
ing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND AMERICAN DIPLO-
MACY, supra note 8, at 7; Hearings on Sanctions Reform, supra note 8, at 55.
24. The United States imposed restrictions on shipments of nuclear fuel to Argen-
tina, Brazil, India, Pakistan, South Africa, and Taiwan, for those nations' attempts to seek
and obtain nuclear weaponry technology. And, the United States applied financial lever-
age against South Korea to stall its plans to build a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant.
Smith, supra note 21, at 333 n.26.
25. Carter, supra note 15, at 1170 (1987).
26. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, supra note 8, at 2.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.; cf. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000) (deciding
that a federal statute imposing economic sanctions on Burma preempted the Massachu-
setts Selective Purchasing Law, which imposed sanctions against companies that con-
ducted trade with Burma).
30. Ancient Greece used sanctions. In 432 B.C., Pericles, due to Megara's acquisi-
tion of land and alleged kidnapping activities, placed restrictions on the amount of
Megarian products that could be brought into Athens. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSID-
ERED, supra note 11, at 21.
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served instrumental foreign policy roles throughout U.S. history. The colo-
nists used sanctions as a means of protest against England prior to and
during the Revolutionary War.3 1 The U.S. government relied upon eco-
nomic sanctions prior to the War of 1812 to attempt to isolate itself from
the brewing controversies between France and Great Britain. 32 The United
States did not again impose sanctions upon another foreign state until
World War I, when President Wilson began advocating the use of eco-
nomic sanctions as a tool of American foreign policy.33 Sanctions have
steadily become more popular since World War 1,34 with a dramatic
increase in use during the 1990s. 3 5 During 1998 alone, for instance, the
United States issued sanctions against twenty-six nations, covering one-
half of the world's population and depriving U.S. businessmen of billions
of customers.3 6 No other nation has relied on the use of economic sanc-
tions so heavily.3
7
Sanctions became prevalent in American foreign policy during the
1990's for a number of reasons. First, the fall of the Soviet Union and end
of the Cold War removed Soviet opposition to U.S. sanctions. 38 During the
Cold War, the United States hesitated to issue economic sanctions against
31. In protest against English taxes and authority, the colonists implemented a num-
ber of boycotts against British products. Carter, supra note 15, at 1169 n.19.
32. The United States imposed trade embargoes in 1807 and 1811, in attempt to
remain uninvolved in the controversies between France and Great Britain that eventually
led to the War of 1812. Id.
33. "A nation that is boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender. Apply this
economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be no need for force. It does
not cost a life outside the nation boycotted, but it brings a pressure upon the nation
which, in my judgment, no modern nation could resist. President Woodrow Wilson,
1919." Use and Effect of Unilateral Trade Sanctions: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
Trade of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. 108 (1997) (Statement of
Kimberly Ann Elliott, Research Fellow, Institute for International Economics) (quoting
AMERICAN COUNCIL ON PUBLIC AFFAIRS, WILSON'S IDEALS 108 (Saul K. Padover, ed., 1942)).
34. Hufbauer and Schott estimate economic sanctions were implemented 103 times
between the years of 1914 and 1984. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 11,
at 2, 13-20.
35. Another study estimates that from 1994-1999 the United States issued sanctions
75 times, which is more than half the number sanctions that have been imposed since
WWII. GEORGE E. SHAMBAUGH, STATES, FIRMS, AND POWER: SUCCESSFUL SANCTIONS IN
UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY xiv (1999) (citing Richard Haas, Sanctions Almost Never
Work, WALL ST. J., June 19, 1998, at A14.).
36. Hearings on Sanctions Reform, supra note 8, at 63 (statement of Stuart E. Eizen-
stat, Under Sec'y of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs); Greg
Farmer, Unilateral Sanctions: Who Really Loses?, THE HILL, Sept. 30, 1998, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Allnews File; U.S. Int'l. Trade Comm'n, Pub. No. 3124, Overview
and Analysis of Current U.S. Unilateral Economic Sanctions ix-x (1998).
37. Hufbauer's study estimates that between 1914 and 1984, the United States
issued sanctions 68 times, the United Kingdom imposed sanctions in 21 instances, and
the Soviet Union deployed sanctions 10 times. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED,
supra note 11, at 7.
38. [S]anctions can now be introduced without Russian opposition, be it politi-
cal (where a Russian veto in the Security Council is by no means automatic);
economic (Russia has less of a commitment to relationships that would lead it to
provide aid and thereby offset any penalty imposed on one of its allies); or mili-
tary (Russia is less likely than was the Soviet Union to block any Western or U.S.
attempt to enforce a trade-related sanction).
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states politically aligned with the Soviet Union, fearing the Soviet govern-
ment would challenge the sanctions.39 Second, the growth of the media,
Internet, and satellite technology enabled Americans to receive around-the-
clock video coverage of international conflicts, inducing strong emotional
reactions and public demand for a U.S. response. 40 Sanctions provided
politicians with an easy way to respond to the public demand for a U.S.
response.41 A third contributing factor to the increased use of sanctions
was the growth of lobbyists and nongovernmental organizations.4 2 These
"single-issue consistencies" bombarded U.S. politicians with campaign
funding, media campaigns, and slanted data to pressure them into issuing
sanctions against foreign governments. 43
C. Legality of Economic Sanctions Under International Law
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter prohibits the "threat or use of force"
against another state. 44 Developing nations argue that unilateral economic
sanctions, which are sanctions imposed by one nation against another, vio-
late this prohibition on the use of force. Nations targeted by unilateral
sanctions also allege that states imposing economic sanctions violate Arti-
cle 2(7) of the U.N. Charter by intervening within the target nation's
domestic jurisdiction and state sovereignty. 45
Although the United Nations has indicated that economic sanctions
do not qualify as a use of force 4 6 and that countries may use unilateral
economic sanctions within other nations to uphold international norms, 47
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, supra note 8, at 5.
39. Id.
40. "The ... CNN effect can increase the visibility throughout the United States of
problems in another country and stimulate a desire on the part of Americans to
respond." Id. at 3. Senator Helms accused President Clinton of relying on the CNN-
effect to appeal to Americans. Helms contends President Clinton attempted to look
tough on international wrongdoing by signing sanctions legislation on national televi-
sion. Helms, supra note 14, at 6.
41. Lt. Col. Susan S. Gibson, International Economic Sanctions: The Importance of
Government Structures, 13 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 161, 184-86 (1999) (arguing the CNN-
effect can be more influential factor when the government does not have a clearly
defined policy).
42. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, supra note 8, at 3 ("[These]
[s]mall, organized, focused groups can have an impact far beyond their actual strength,
especially . . . when no equally focused countervailing force exists.").
43. Human rights groups opposed to South Africa's apartheid attracted Congres-
sional attention and successfully lobbied for the imposition of U.S. sanctions. Id. The
U.S. business group, USA*Engage, on the other hand, launched a massive lobbying cam-
paign in 1997 to put an end to U.S. sanctions. E.g., USA Engage - About Us, at http://
www.usaengage.org/background/about.html (last updated Mar. 4, 2001).
44. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
45. Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internationalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26
YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 49 (2001).
46. Jeong Hwa Pires, Note: North Korean Time Bomb: Can Sanctions Defuse It? A
Review of International Economic Sanctions as an Option, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 307,
313 (1994).
47. Unilateral Economic Measures as a Means of Political and Economic Coercion
Against Developing Countries: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess.,
Agenda Item 97(c), at 4, U.N. Doc. A/54/486 (1999).
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the U.N. has imposed limitations on the use of unilateral economic sanc-
tions. In 1984, the General Assembly stated that nations should not
impose economic sanctions that violate the international norms of the
U.N. Charter. 48 Nations cannot use unilateral sanctions "as tools for politi-
cal or economic pressure against any country, particularly against develop-
ing countries, because of the negative effects on the realization of all
human rights. '49 Thus, while some unilateral sanctions may be illegal
under international law, a state's use of unilateral economic sanctions does
not automatically violate the U.N. Charter.50 However, unilateral sanc-
tions must support internationally agreed upon norms and expectations to
qualify as legal actions under the U.N. Charter. 5 1
Similar to the prohibition on intervention within Article 2(7) of the
U.N. Charter, 52 customary international law forbids states from interfering
with the domestic affairs of another nation. 53 Although economic sanc-
tions may qualify as a form of intervention into a foreign nation's domes-
ticity, it is unlikely that a customary international norm against the use of
economic sanctions exists.54 Since the development of the U.N. prohibi-
tion on the use of force, nations have turned to economic sanctions to
resolve disputes.55 In fact, Gary Hufbauer estimates that economic sanc-
tions were implemented 103 times between 1914 and 1984.56 This high
use of unilateral sanctions over a sizeable time period indicates that the use
of economic sanctions has become an accepted customary international
norm.5 7 The International Court of Justice solidified this theory in Nicara-
gua v. United States, finding that economic sanctions do not violate the
customary international norm of non-intervention.5 8
48. G.A. Res. 39/210, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, 104th plen. mtg. at 160,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/210 (1984).
49. Isabella D. Bunn, The Right to Development: Implications for International Eco-
nomic Law, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1425, 1459 (2000) (quoting G.A. Res. 141, U.N.
GAOR, 53rd Sess., 85th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/141 (1999).
50. Cleveland, supra note 45, at 49.
51. Based on the international customary norm against the use of nuclear weapons,
it is highly likely that anti-proliferation sanctions comply with the internationally
accepted norms within the U.N. Charter.
52. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7 ("Nothing contained in the present Charter shall
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state.").
53. Cleveland, supra note 45, at 53.
54. Id.
55. Pires, supra note 46, at 313.
56. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 11, at 2, 13-20.
57. Cleveland, supra note 45, at 53.
58. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14 (June 27).
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II. The Arms Export Control Act and Testing by Non-Nuclear
Weapons States
A. U.S. Sanctions Legislation Aimed at the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons
The Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act 59 outlines the U.S. policy for
preventing the international expansion of nuclear weapons technologies.
The statute commits the United States to encouraging nations to sign the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to rewarding those
non-nuclear-weapon states that remain loyal to their non-proliferation
pledges, to seeking new non-nuclear energy sources, and to developing
international sanctions against non-nuclear-weapon states that seek and
obtain nuclear capabilities in contravention of their treaty obligations. 60
The Arms Export Control Act, 61 also known as the Glenn Amend-
ment, expands the U.S. commitment to non-proliferation by imposing
mandatory sanctions upon any non-nuclear weapons state that receives or
detonates a nuclear weapon. Once the President learns that a non-nuclear-
weapon state has gained nuclear weapon capabilities, the Arms Export
Control Act requires him or her to immediately impose several different
types of sanctions and includes the following: termination of all forms of
foreign aid and trade promotion programs,62 prohibition on the sale and
financing of U.S. defense materials and services to the target country, pro-
hibition on U.S. financial institutions from engaging in loans or transac-
tions with the target country, and opposition to all international financial
institution loans to the target country.63 The sanctions purport to serve
the dual purpose of (1) deterring other non-nuclear-weapon states from
obtaining nuclear weapon capabilities and (2) motivating new nuclear-
weapon states to pledge to cease all nuclear testing and commit themselves
to global disarmament. 64
The United States did not implement the 1978 Arms Export Control
Act's sanctions for nuclear weapons testing prior to India's and Pakistan's
nuclear tests in 1998.65 Hence, President Clinton and Congress had no
experience with the mandatory sanctions regime portion of the statute.
The statute provides the President with few options in the imposition of
sanctions. 66 Regardless of the circumstances surrounding the nuclear
weapons testing, the President must either fully implement the stipulated
sanctions or get Congressional approval to waive the sanctions through a
59. 22 U.S.C.A. 3201 (2000).
60. Id.
61. 22 U.S.C.S. 2799aa-1 (2000).
62. The statute does not prohibit humanitarian, food or other agricultural commodi-
ties, or medical assistance. id.
63. Id.
64. India-Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation, supra note 6, at 4.
65. Id. at 50 (statement of Ambassador David L. Aaron, Undersecretary of Com-
merce for International Trade).
66. Id. at 49 (statement of Ambassador David L. Aaron, Undersecretary of Com-
merce for International Trade).
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joint resolution in both the Senate and House of Representatives. 67 The
Arms Export Control Act does not contain a termination provision for
implemented sanctions. 68 Therefore, the sanctions do not terminate until
both the Senate and House of Representatives pass legislation to lift the
sanctions.69
Although the Glen Amendment provides the President with few
options for responding to a non-nuclear-weapon state's acquisition of
nuclear weapons, it does not require a total ban on U.S. trade with the
violating state. 70 The statute forbids the sale of items or services, such as
computer technology, chemicals, and military equipment that could be
used for the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 71 The sanctions statute also
prohibits U.S. trade with government entities that are affiliated with their
nation's military operations or nuclear programs. 72 Even though the Arms
Export Control Act permits all other forms of trade with states that have
acquired nuclear weapons, it significantly impacts U.S. businesses through
its denial of U.S. government financial assistance to trade promotion pro-
grams.73 American businesses, for example, depend on the U.S. govern-
ment's trade program for their investment projects and trade relations in
India.74 Withholding such financial support will render many projects
unprofitable.
B. U.S. Response to the India-Pakistan Nuclear Testing Situation
Prior to India's and Pakistan's nuclear tests in 1998, both states were con-
sidered to be non-nuclear-weapon states. 75 Their testing served as the first
formal announcement that their governments had acquired nuclear weap-
onry. Hence, their testing triggered the immediate imposition of Arms
Export Control Act sanctions by the United States.76 Displeased with the
resulting impact of the Arms Export Control Act on economic relations
67. Arms Export Control Act of 1978 § 102, 22 U.S.C.S. 2799aa-1 (2000); India-
Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation, supra note 6, at 49 (statement of Ambassador David L.
Aaron, Undersecretary of Commerce for International Trade).
68. Arms Export Control Act of 1978 § 102, 22 U.S.C.S. 2799aa-1 (2000).
69. Mrs. Watu, supra note 16, at 565.
70. India-Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation, supra note 6, at 50 (statement of Ambassa-
dor David L. Aaron, Undersecretary of Commerce for International Trade).
71. Arms Export Control Act of 1978 § 102, 22 U.S.C.S. 2799aa-1 (2000).
72. Id.
73. India-Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation, supra note 6, at 52 (statement of Ambassa-
dor David L. Aaron, Undersecretary of Commerce for International Trade).
74. Id. at 52 (statement of Ambassador David L. Aaron, Undersecretary of Com-
merce for International Trade).
75. There are some reports, however, that in 1990 South Asia was on the verge of a
nuclear war. Indian officials have denied that such a nuclear crisis ever existed, but a
retired Indian official has revealed that India was extremely concerned about a nuclear
battle with Pakistan during the spring of 1990 and that the two states were much closer
to a nuclear war than the U.S.-U.S.S.R. standoff during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Sey-
mour Hersh, On the Nuclear Edge, THE NEW YORKER, March 29, 1993, at 56-73; Seymour
Hersh, Watching the Warheads, THE NEW YORKER, November 5, 2001, at 52.
76. Arms Export Control Act of 1978 § 102, 22 U.S.C.S. 2799aa-1 (2000); see also
India-Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation, supra note 6, at 49 (statement of Ambassador David
L. Aaron, Undersecretary of Commerce for International Trade).
Vol. 35
2001-2002 Arms Export Control Act Sanctions
with India and Pakistan, Congress passed the India-Pakistan Relief Act 7 7 to
alleviate some of the sanctions imposed by the United States. 78 The enact-
ment empowered the President to waive application of any sanction against
India or Pakistan, excluding those sanctions directed towards government
entities that contributed to the development of India's or Pakistan's nuclear
weapons arsenals.7 9 Consequently, President Clinton had one year to
waive U.S. sanctions that prohibited American bank loans to India and
Pakistan, forbade all U.S. government non-military assistance to both
nations, and denied U.S. support for international financial institutional
loans.8 0 To exercise these waiver powers, the President had to communi-
cate his intentions to the Committee for Foreign Relations in the Senate, the
House International Relations Committee, and the Senate and House
Appropriations Committees.8 1 The Relief Act also required the Secretary
of State to update these Congressional committees on India's and Paki-
stan's nuclear weapons status.
8 2
President Clinton exercised his Relief Act waiver authority on two sep-
arate occasions and waived a portion of the U.S. sanctions against India
and Pakistan.8 3 First, President Clinton waived the Arms Export Control
Act sanctions pertaining to the Export-Import Bank, Overseas Private
Investment Corporation, Trade and Development Agency, and Interna-
tional Military Education and Training program.8 4 President Clinton's
first waiver document also permitted U.S. private financial institutions to
issue loans to the Indian and Pakistani governments and opened U.S. assis-
tance to the Asian Elephant Conservation Fund, the Rhinoceros and Tiger
Conservation Fund, and Indo-American Environmental Leadership pro-
gram.8 5 In March 2000, President Clinton lifted additional sanctions
against India, re-instituting U.S. assistance to India through the South Asia
Regional Initiative/Energy program, Presidential Initiative on Internet for
Economic Development, the Financial Institution Reform and Expansion
program, and United States Educational Foundation in India Environmen-
tal Exchange.8 6
Political activity surrounding the Arms Export Control Act sanctions
against India and Pakistan resumed in 2001 when President Bush took
office. Congress developed two bills that proposed to lift all Arms Export
77. India-Pakistan Relief Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 106-79, Title IX, § 9001, 113 Stat.
1283.
78. "It is the sense of Congress that broad application of export controls to nearly
300 India and Pakistan entities is inconsistent with the specific national security inter-
ests of the United States and that this control list requires refinement." Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Proclamation No. 2000-4, 64 Fed. Reg. 60,649 (Oct. 27, 1999); Proclamation
No. 2000-18, 65 Fed. Reg. 16,297 (March 16, 2000).
84. Proclamation No. 2000-4, 64 Fed. Reg. 60,649 (Oct. 27, 1999).
85. Id.
86. Proclamation No. 2000-18, 65 Fed. Reg. 16,297 (March 16, 2000).
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Control Act sanctions against India and Pakistan.8 7 One bill proposed to
lift sanctions against both countries, 8 8 while the other bill called for an
elimination of the Arms Export Control Act sanctions against India.8 9 This
pending legislation remains unnecessary, however, as President Bush
waived all remaining Arms Export Control Act sanctions against India and
Pakistan on September 22, 2001.90
III. Sanctions Reform Proposals
A. Introduction
Not long after India and Pakistan engaged in their nuclear weapons tests,
Congress put forth a number of bills aimed at reforming U.S. economic
sanctions policy, including the Sanctions Rationalization Act, 9 1 the Eco-
nomic Sanctions Reform Act (ESRA), 9 2 the Sanctions Policy Reform Act,9 3
and the Enhancement of Trade, Security, and Human Rights through Sanc-
tions Reform Act (Sanctions Enhancement Act).9 4 The Clinton Administra-
tion supported the sanctions reform movement and made numerous
recommendations on how to improve U.S. sanctions, including the
mandatory addition of termination provisions and Presidential waivers to
all future sanctions legislation.9 5 While all the sanctions reform proposals
were committed to changing how the United States uses economic sanc-
tions as a foreign policy tool, each of the recommendations proposed to
reform U.S. policy in a different way. Some proposals set out specific
requirements for the President and Congress, whereas others provided gen-
eral recommendations on how both branches should handle sanctions pol-
icies.9 6 The main points of contention among the proposals concern how
87. H.R. 2889, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 1358, 107th Cong. (2001).
88. H.R. 1358, 107th Cong. (2001).
89. H.R. 2889, 107th Cong. (2001).
90. Pres. Determination No. 2001-28, 66 Fed. Reg. 50,095 (Sept. 22, 2001).
91. The Sanctions Rationalization Act of 1999, S. 927, 106th Cong. (1999).
92. The Economic Sanctions Reform Act of 1999, S. 1161, 106th Cong. (1999).
93. The Sanctions Policy Reform Act, S. 757, 106th Cong. (1999).
94. The Enhancement of Trade, Security, & Human Rights Through Sanctions
Reform Act, H.R. 1244, 106th Cong. (1999).
95. Hearings on Sanctions Reform, supra note 8, at 62 (statement of Stuart E. Eizen-
stat, Under Sec'y of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs); Agricultural
Sanctions: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry,
106th Cong. 63, 67 (1999) (statement of Stuart E. Eizenstat, Under Sec'y of State for
Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs) [hereinafter Agricultural Sanctions].
96. The Enhancement of Trade, Security, & Human Rights Through Sanctions
Reform Act and Sanctions Policy Reform Act bills list a comprehensive series of detailed
requirements for the sanctions process from establishing how Congress should intro-
duce sanctions legislation to determining when sanctions against a target country end.
The Sanctions Policy Reform Act, S. 757, 106th Cong. (1999); The Enhancement of
Trade, Security, & Human Rights Through Sanctions Reform Act, H.R. 1244, 106th
Cong. (1999). The Economic Sanctions Reform Act of 1999 also discusses the various
phases of sanctions policies from implementation through termination, but it does so
through a more flexible set of guidelines on what Congress and the President should do
at each stage of the sanctions. The Economic Sanctions Reform Act of 1999, S. 1161,
106th Cong. (1999). The Sanctions Rationalization Act of 1999 has the least to say
about the entire sanctions process, commenting only on when the President may delay,
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Congress and the President should introduce sanctions legislation,
whether and how much advance notice should be provided to the general
pubic, whether the President should have the authority to exercise a
national interest waiver, and how sanctions should be terminated. None of
the proposals became law. However, Secretary of State Colin Powell has
indicated that the Bush Administration intends to continue the sanctions
reform movement. 97
B. Considerations, Communications, and Procedural Requirements
Most of the Congressional bills provided guidelines for both the President
and Congress on forming and implementing sanctions policies. The Sanc-
tions Enhancement Act,98 Sanctions Policy Reform Act,99 and Economic
Sanctions Reform Act' 00 bills stressed that Congress must fully assess all
available information regarding the proposed economic sanctions before it
acts. These bills stipulated that all newly proposed Congressional sanc-
tions legislation must' 01 state the intended objective and goals of the sanc-
tions regime, structure the sanctions so as only to affect the target state or
government while minimizing the impact on humanitarian activities, 10 2
provide contract sanctity, and exclude sanctions on medicine, medical
equipment, and agricultural commodities. 10 3 The bills also required Con-
gress to consider the likelihood that the proposed sanctions will achieve
suspend, terminate, or resume sanctions and how Congress can voice its disapproval of
the President's decisions. The Sanctions Rationalization Act of 1999, S. 927, 106th
Cong. (1999).
97. Sanctions reform has been temporarily placed on the legislation backburner, but
there are indications that the movement to reform U.S. sanctions is not over. During his
confirmation hearing, Secretary of State Colin Powell indicated that he plans to push for
change in U.S. sanctions policy. When asked about his views on sanctions, he
responded, "I would like to participate with [Congress] in discussing how to get rid of
most of them." Robin Wright, Powell Intends to Curb U.S. Use of Diplomatic Sanctions,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2001, at Al-i.
98. The Enhancement of Trade, Security, & Human Rights Through Sanctions
Reform Act, H.R. 1244, 106th Cong. (1999).
99. The Sanctions Policy Reform Act, S. 757, 106th Cong. (1999).
100. The Economic Sanctions Reform Act of 1999, S. 1161, 106th Cong. (1999).
101. Again, the main difference between these bills is their tone and authoritative-
ness. The Enhancement of Trade, Security, & Human Rights Through Sanctions Reform
and Sanctions Policy Reform Act required that Congress consider such information,
whereas the Economic Sanctions Reform Act of 1999 only recommended that Congress
take into account such information. The Economic Sanctions Reform Act of 1999, S.
1161, 106th Cong. (1999); The Sanctions Policy Reform Act, S. 757, 106th Cong.
(1999); The Enhancement of Trade, Security, & Human Rights Through Sanctions
Reform Act, H.R. 1244, 106th Cong. (1999). However, the Economic Sanctions Reform
Act's provision that it "shall not be in order in either the House or Senate to consider
sanctions legislation unless they follow the above guidelines" indicated Congress does
not have complete flexibility in choosing how to proceed with sanctions legislation. The
Economic Sanctions Reform Act of 1999, S. 1161, 106th Cong. (1999).
102. Humanitarian activities include U.S. government programs or non-governmental
organizations that are working to improve the humanitarian conditions within the target
country. The Enhancement of Trade, Security, & Human Rights Through Sanctions
Reform Act, H.R. 1244, 106th Cong. (1999).
103. The Sanctions Policy Reform Act, S. 757, 106th Cong. (1999); The Economic
Sanctions Reform Act of 1999, S. 1161, 106th Cong. (1999); The Enhancement of Trade,
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the intended goals within a reasonable amount of time, the probable
impact of the sanctions on the quality of life of the target state's citizens,
and the sanctions' anticipated effect on relations with U.S. allies and U.S.
national security. 10 4 Furthermore, the proposed legislation would have
required Congress to assess the likelihood that other nations will join the
United States in issuing sanctions against the target country; the
probability the target state or its allies will retaliate against the United
States; whether existing U.S. treaty obligations conflict with the proposed
sanctions; other diplomatic actions the United States has taken toward the
target state in advancing the sanctions' objectives; and whether there are
more effective foreign policy alternatives to economic sanctions. 10 5
The proposed Sanctions Policy Reform Act 10 6 and Sanctions Enhance-
ment Act 10 7 differed from the Economic Sanctions Reform Act bill 108 in
that the former required the President, Secretary of Agriculture, and Con-
gressional Budget Office to present much of the information on the bene-
fits and consequences of proposed sanctions legislation. 10 9 Under both
bills, once Congress has introduced sanctions legislation, the President
must issue a report on the proposed legislation within thirty days." 0 The
Secretary of Agriculture must then report on the proposed sanctions
expected impact on agricultural trade, and the Congressional Budget
Office must inform Congress of the estimated short- and long-term costs of
the proposed sanctions."' The Economic Sanctions Reform Act, on the
other hand, did not stipulate how Congress would attain the required
information.112
While the Sanctions Policy Reform Act,113 Sanctions Enhancement
Security, & Human Rights Through Sanctions Reform Act, H.R. 1244, 106th Cong.
(1999).
104. The Sanctions Policy Reform Act, S. 757, 106th Cong. (1999); The Economic
Sanctions Reform Act of 1999, S. 1161, 106th Cong. (1999); The Enhancement of Trade,
Security, & Human Rights Through Sanctions Reform Act, H.R. 1244, 106th Cong.
(1999).
105. The Sanctions Policy Reform Act, S. 757, 106th Cong. (1999); The Economic
Sanctions Reform Act of 1999, S. 1161, 106th Cong. (1999); The Enhancement of Trade,
Security, & Human Rights Through Sanctions Reform Act, H.R. 1244, 106th Cong.
(1999).
106. The Sanctions Policy Reform Act, S. 757, 106th Cong. (1999).
107. The Enhancement of Trade, Security, & Human Rights Through Sanctions
Reform Act, H.R. 1244, 106th Cong. (1999).
108. The Economic Sanctions Reform Act of 1999, S. 1161, 106th Cong. (1999).
109. See The Sanctions Policy Reform Act, S. 757, 106th Cong. (1999); The Enhance-
ment of Trade, Security, & Human Rights Through Sanctions Reform Act, H.R. 1244,
106th Cong. (1999).
110. See The Sanctions Policy Reform Act, S. 757, 106th Cong. (1999); The Enhance-
ment of Trade, Security, & Human Rights Through Sanctions Reform Act, H.R. 1244,
106th Cong. (1999).
111. See The Sanctions Policy Reform Act, S. 757, 106th Cong. (1999); The Enhance-
ment of Trade, Security, & Human Rights Through Sanctions Reform Act, H.R. 1244,
106th Cong. (1999).
112. See The Economic Sanctions Reform Act of 1999, S. 1161, 106th Cong. (1999).
113. The Sanctions Policy Reform Act, S. 757, 106th Cong. (1999).
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Act, 114 and Economic Sanctions Reform Act' 15 bills each limited the exec-
utive branch's ability to implement unilateral economic sanctions, the bills
differed in their approach. Maintaining its flexible, unimposing tone, the
Economic Sanctions Reform Act' 16 bill stated that the President should
create sanctions formation guidelines similar to the legislative branch
guidelines.1 17 It also recommended that the executive branch establish its
own public relations procedures for notifying the public of changes in U.S.
sanctions policy. 118 Alternatively, the Sanctions Policy Reform Act 1 9 and
Sanctions Enhancement Act 120 bills listed specific requirements for the
executive branch. If enacted, these bills would create a Sanctions Review
Committee within the executive branch to review U.S. sanctions policy and
make recommendations to the President. 12 1 After deciding that economic
sanctions should be imposed against a target country, the President would
have to meet with the Sanctions Review Committee to discuss the benefits
and consequences of the proposed economic sanctions. 12 2 Then, the Pres-
ident would have to submit a report, explaining the benefits and conse-
quences, to several Congressional committees.' 23 Finally, the President
must publish his sanctions plan 124 within the Federal Register at least
forty-five days prior to the date the sanctions would be implemented. 125
During the time between publication in the Federal Register and imposi-
tion of the sanctions, the President would review the Secretary of Agricul-
ture's and U.S. International Trade Commission's reports on the proposed
sanctions policy and continue to negotiate with the target government to
try to resolve the underlying issues. 12 6
114. The Enhancement of Trade, Security, & Human Rights Through Sanctions
Reform Act, H.R. 1244, 106th Cong. (1999).
115. The Economic Sanctions Reform Act of 1999, S. 1161, 106th Cong. (1999).
116. Id.
117. See id.
118. See id..
119. The Sanctions Policy Reform Act, S. 757, 106th Cong. (1999).
120. The Economic Sanctions Reform Act of 1999, S. 1161, 106th Cong. (1999).
121. See The Sanctions Policy Reform Act, S. 757, 106th Cong. (1999); The Economic
Sanctions Reform Act of 1999, S. 1161, 106th Cong. (1999).
122. See The Sanctions Policy Reform Act, S. 757, 106th Cong. (1999); The Economic
Sanctions Reform Act of 1999, S. 1161, 106th Cong. (1999).
123. See The Sanctions Policy Reform Act, S. 757, 106th Cong. (1999); The Economic
Sanctions Reform Act of 1999, S. 1161, 106th Cong. (1999).
124. Like the Congressional requirements, the President's sanctions plan would have
to include an assessment of the probability of the proposed sanctions policy achieving
its goals within a reasonable time, provide for contract sanctity protections for existing
contracts at the time of the imposition of sanctions, and aim towards having minimal
effect on humanitarian activities, common citizens or entities other than the target gov-
ernment. See The Sanctions Policy Reform Act, S. 757, 106th Cong. (1999); The Eco-
nomic Sanctions Reform Act of 1999, S. 1161, 106th Cong. (1999).
125. See The Sanctions Policy Reform Act, S. 757, 106th Cong. (1999); The Economic
Sanctions Reform Act of 1999, S. 1161, 106th Cong. (1999).
126. See The Sanctions Policy Reform Act, S. 757, 106th Cong. (1999); The Economic
Sanctions Reform Act of 1999, S. 1161, 106th Cong. (1999).
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C. Waiver, Termination, and Suspension of Sanctions Policies
Other issues within the sanctions reform proposals pertain to how existing
sanctions policies are suspended or terminated, whether the President has
national interest waiver authority to waive imposition of sanctions, and
whether Congress can override the President's economic sanctions deci-
sions.127 The Clinton Administration's proposals urged Congress to pro-
vide the President with a national interest waiver, which would enable the
President to terminate sanctions completely or to alter the quantity, inten-
sity, or length of sanctions to better fit the circumstances of the situation
and align the sanctions with their stated objectives. 128 The Economic
Sanctions Reform Act 129 and Sanctions Rationalization Act' 30 bills granted
the President authority to delay, suspend, terminate, and refrain from
imposing sanctions whenever he or she determines the sanctions policy's
costs outweighs its expected gains, as long as the President provides suffi-
cient notice of such decision to the designated Congressional commit-
tees.13 1 Under these proposals, the President's decision to impose
sanctions or refrain from imposing sanctions becomes effective immedi-
ately unless Congress enacts a joint resolution within thirty days of the
President's announced decision. 13 2 The Sanctions Policy Reform Act 133
and Sanctions Enhancement Act13 4 bills also provided the President with
waiver authority, but only during times of national emergency or for spe-
cific existing sanctions legislation. 13 5 The President may waive portions of
the Arms Export Control Act sanctions, for example, if the President finds
that waiving the sanctions would advance the goals of the statute or
national security interests. 136 If the President exercises his waiver author-
ity, the proposed legislation requires the President to issue bi-annual
reports on the developments that have occurred within the target country
127. See The Sanctions Policy Reform Act, S. 757, 106th Cong. (1999); The Sanctions
Rationalization Act of 1999, S. 927, 106th Cong. (1999); The Enhancement of Trade,
Security, & Human Rights Through Sanctions Reform Act, H.R. 1244, 106th Cong.
(1999); The Economic Sanctions Reform Act of 1999, S. 1161, 106th Cong. (1999).
128. See Hearings on Sanctions Reform, supra note 8, at 62 (statement of Stuart E.
Eizenstat, Under Sec'y Of State for Economics, Business, and Agricultural Affairs).
129. The Economic Sanctions Reform Act of 1999, S. 1161, 106th Cong. (1999).
130. The Sanctions Rationalization Act of 1999, S. 927, 106th Cong. (1999).
131. See The Economic Sanctions Reform Act of 1999, S. 1161, 106th Cong. (1999);
The Sanctions Rationalization Act of 1999, S. 927, 106th Cong. (1999).
132. See The Economic Sanctions Reform Act of 1999, S. 1161, 106th Cong. (1999);
The Sanctions Rationalization Act of 1999, S. 927, 106th Cong. (1999).
133. The Sanctions Policy Reform Act, S. 757, 106th Cong. (1999).
134. The Enhancement of Trade, Security, & Human Rights Through Sanctions
Reform Act, H.R. 1244, 106th Cong. (1999).
135. See The Sanctions Policy Reform Act, S. 757, 106th Cong. (1999); The Enhance-
ment of Trade, Security, & Human Rights Through Sanctions Reform Act, H.R. 1244,
106th Cong. (1999).
136. See The Sanctions Policy Reform Act, S. 757, 106th Cong. (1999); The Enhance-
ment of Trade, Security, & Human Rights Through Sanctions Reform Act, H.R. 1244,
106th Cong. (1999).
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and state the reasons for continuing the waiver.13 7
The legislative and executive branch proposals also differed in their
specifications as to how sanctions terminate. Congress' Sanctions Policy
Reform Act 138 and Sanctions Enhancement Act 139 bills stipulated that eco-
nomic sanctions expire two years after they are imposed unless renewed by
the government branch that initially implemented them. 14 0 The Sanctions
Policy Reform Act, 14 1 Economic Sanctions Reform Act,14 2 and Sanctions
Enhancement Act 14 3 bills would also require the President to make annual
reports on existing sanctions. Within these reports, the President must
evaluate whether the sanctions have achieved their intended goals, the like-
lihood that the sanctions will achieve their objectives within a reasonable
time, and the extent to which the existing sanctions have negatively
affected humanitarian activities. 144 The Clinton Administration argued
that the decision to terminate or continue a sanctions policy should be
based on the sanctions policy's overall effectiveness in achieving its
intended goals, rather than a pre-determined date. 145 The administration
proposed that instead of adopting automatic termination provisions, Con-
gress should require the President to annually review ongoing sanctions
and determine whether the sanctions should be terminated. 14 6 Factors for
review would include whether the sanctions met their original objectives,
created an excessive amount of negative, unintended consequences, or
imposed high CoStS. 1 4 7 Again, if Congress did not agree with the Presi-
dent's decision to maintain or terminate a sanctions regime, it could enact
137. See The Sanctions Policy Reform Act, S. 757, 106th Cong. (1999); The Enhance-
ment of Trade, Security, & Human Rights Through Sanctions Reform Act, H.R. 1244,
106th Cong. (1999).
138. The Sanctions Policy Reform Act, S. 757, 106th Cong. (1999).
139. The Enhancement of Trade, Security, & Human Rights Through Sanctions
Reform Act, H.R. 1244, 106th Cong. (1999).
140. If Congress imposed the economic sanctions through legislation, then Congress
has the authority to renew the sanctions at the end of the two-year period. Similarly, if
the President imposed the sanctions, then he or she has the authority to renew the sanc-
tions at the end of the two-year period. See The Sanctions Policy Reform Act, S. 757,
106th Cong. (1999); The Enhancement of Trade, Security, & Human Rights Through
Sanctions Reform Act, H.R. 1244, 106th Cong. (1999).
141. The Sanctions Policy Reform Act, S. 757, 106th Cong. (1999).
142. The Economic Sanctions Reform Act of 1999, S. 1161, 106th Cong. (1999).
143. The Enhancement of Trade, Security, & Human Rights Through Sanctions
Reform Act, H.R. 1244, 106th Cong. (1999).
144. See The Economic Sanctions Reform Act of 1999, S. 1161, 106th Cong. (1999);
The Sanctions Policy Reform Act, S. 757, 106th Cong. (1999); The Enhancement of
Trade, Security, & Human Rights Through Sanctions Reform Act, H.R. 1244, 106th
Cong. (1999).
145. See Hearings on Sanctions Reform, supra note 8, at 62 (statement of Stuart E.
Eizenstat, Under Sec'y of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs); Agri-
cultural Sanctions, supra note 95, at 67 (statement of Stuart E. Eizenstat, Under Sec'y of
State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs).
146. See Hearings on Sanctions Reform, supra note 8, at 62 (statement of Stuart E.
Eizenstat, Under Sec'y of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs).
147. Agricultural Sanctions, supra note 95, at 67 (statement of Stuart E. Eizenstat,
Under Sec'y of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs).
Cornell International Law Journal
legislation to override the President's decision. 148
IV. Critiquing the Arms Export Control Act Sanctions
The two major goals of the Arms Export Control Act sanctions are (1) to
deter nations without nuclear weapons capabilities from seeking and
obtaining weapons of mass destruction, thereby preventing a global arms
race; and (2) to coerce the newly created nuclear-weapon states to commit
to global non-proliferation treaties. 1 49 Focusing on the 1998 India-Paki-
stan nuclear weapons testing situation, the imposition of U.S. sanctions
under the Arms Export Control Act did not successfully accomplish either
of these objectives.
A study conducted in India in 1994, four years prior to that country's
nuclear testing, illustrates that the threat of U.S. sanctions was not a power-
ful deterrent to acquiring nuclear weapons.15 0 The majority of Indian citi-
zens surveyed in the study indicated the threat of international sanctions
did not influence their decision to support or oppose India's possible
development of nuclear weapons. 15 1 The citizens most commonly identi-
fied the threat of nuclear attack by Pakistan as the major factor motivating
them to support India's development of nuclear weapons.' 52 They also
indicated that a global nuclear disarmament plan would be the number
one reason for opposing India's development of nuclear weapons.1
5 3
Hence, the threat of economic sanctions by the United States, which, as
India's largest trade and investment partner since 1991, imported over $7.3
148. See Hearings on Sanctions Reform, supra note 8, at 62 (statement of Stuart E.
Eizenstat, Under Sec'y of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs).
149. See India-Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation, supra note 6, at 4 (statement of Karl F.
Inderfurth, Asst. Sec'y of State for South Asian Affairs).
150. An Indian market research company interviewed over nine hundred educated
elite Indian citizens from seven different Indian cities. The interviewers asked the citi-
zens what they thought about India's nuclear policy and to explain the reasoning and
justification behind their opinions. Respondents were divided into three groups: "(a)
supporters of official policy, those who favor neither renouncing nuclear weapons nor
acquiring them; (b) nuclear advocates, those supporting India's acquisition of nuclear
weapons; and (c) nuclear opponents, those favoring renunciation of nuclear weapons."
INDIA AND THE BOMB, supra note 4, at 10. The interviewers asked the official policy sup-
porters to explain what would motivate them to advocate India's acquisition of nuclear
weapons and what might persuade them to renounce the quest for nuclear weapons
capabilities. The study also requested the nuclear advocates to indicate what factors
might persuade them to renounce nuclear weaponry. Nuclear opponents likewise listed
what circumstances might induce them to support India's acquisition of nuclear weap-
ons. See id.
151. Only 7 percent of respondents within the supporters of official policy category
indicated the international threat of sanctions would induce them to renounce India's
nuclear option. Similarly, only eight percent of the nuclear advocate respondents noted
that the threat of sanctions would be a consideration for deciding to oppose nuclear
weapons development. See id. at 15.
152. See id. at 11.
153. See id. at 11-12. Ninety-two percent of all respondents supported the develop-
ment of an international ban on nuclear weapons. See id. at 16.
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billion of goods and services from India in 1997,154 did not motivate edu-
cated, elite, Indian citizens, many of whom were esteemed leaders within
India's commercial industries, schools, and government,15 5 to oppose the
development of nuclear weapons by India.
The India-Pakistan Relief Act 15 6 further weakened the deterrent effect
of the Arms Export Control Act's economic sanctions. The Arms Export
Control Act's rigid requirements left the United States with little flexibility
to respond to the highly volatile and overwhelmingly complex interna-
tional situations created by India's and Pakistan's nuclear testing.15 7 In
response to this lack of flexibility, Congress enacted the India-Pakistan
Relief Act, 158 which gave the President authority to reduce the Arms
Export Control Act sanctions against Pakistan and India. 159 The Relief
Act, by reducing the level of sanctions initially imposed by the United
States, communicates the message to other nuclear-weapon hopefuls that
the U.S. sanctions might not be as tough and restrictive as they first
seem. 160 Congress' last minute change in its anti-proliferation sanctions
policy suggests that the United States may respond to future nuclear weap-
ons testing by reducing the Arms Export Control Act sanctions, as it did in
he India-Pakistan situation. The Relief Act leads foreign governments to
believe that if they prepare for U.S. sanctions in advance and wait them out
once imposed, then everything will be fine in the long term.' 6 ' Hence, the
Relief Act minimizes the fear factor and deterrence value of the Arms
Export Control Act sanctions.
154. India-Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation, supra note 6, at 9 (Statement of David
Aaron, Under Sec'y for Int'l Trade, U.S. Dept. of Commerce).
155. Only the highest class of Indian citizens were interviewed in the study. The
respondents represented a number of professions, including "government civil service,
academics, science, politics, law, journalism, medicine, business, armed forces, the
police, sports, and the arts." INDIA AND THE BOMB, supra note 4, at 11.
156. India-Pakistan Relief Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 106-79, Title IX, § 9001, 113 Stat.
1283.
157. The Arms Export Control Act required immediate and full imposition of U.S.
sanctions if any state without nuclear weapons capabilities sought and acquired nuclear
weaponry. The President had little ability to adjust the sanctions or quickly respond to
favorable developments within the target states. See Arms Export Control Act of 1978
§ 102, 22 U.S.C.S. 2799aa-1 (2000).
158. India-Pakistan Relief Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 106-79, Title IX, § 9001, 113 Stat.
1283.
159. See id.
160. See Mrs. Watu, supra note 16, at 582-83 ("If the Relief Act illustrates a broader
proposition about the [Clinton] Administration's sanctions 'policy,' it is that it seems
quite content to impose ostensibly tough sanctions up front, and soon thereafter back
off, hence undermining the long-term credibility of the sanctions.").
161. One major complaint about the effectiveness of U.S. economic sanctions centers
around this notion of reaction time. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY,
supra note 8, at 197. Authoritarian governments are often able to withstand the effects
of sanctions by stockpiling items in advance of the sanctions, finding new non-American
suppliers for the sanctioned products, and using the U.S. sanctions to build greater
national unity. Sanctions trigger rally-round-the-flag nationalist reaction - by creating
scarcity, sanctions enable the government to better control distribution of goods and
create sense of siege that the government exploits to maintain political control. Id. at
203.
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Furthermore, the Arms Export Control Act sanctions did not success-
fully push India and Pakistan into adopting disarmament plans.16 2 The
United States implemented the Arms Export Control Act sanctions to place
pressure on both states to formalize pledges to cease further nuclear weap-
ons production or testing, work towards regional peace through direct dia-
logue, and commit to global nuclear weapons disarmament. 16 3 Congress
did not intend for the sanctions to punish India and Pakistan for their deci-
sion to obtain nuclear weaponry, but instead to encourage them to resolve
the tensions that led to the nuclear tests and pledge commitments to
peace. 164 The tense situation between India and Pakistan has not been
resolved, and both governments refuse to make concessions. 165 Neither
state has formally committed to cease production and testing, nor have
they signed the comprehensive test ban treaty. 166
Both Congress and the Clinton Administration attempted to improve
U.S. sanctions policy, but no laws were enacted, nor were any Presidential
guidelines developed. The Bush Administration must take the initiative to
make the reform of anti-proliferation sanctions a top priority. It must
understand the weaknesses of the United States' current sanctions policy
against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the global implications if
the United States fails in the future to deter other non-nuclear-weapon
states from acquiring nuclear weaponry. Most importantly, the Bush
Administration must apply this understanding to its reform proposals and
ensure that the Arms Export Control Act sanctions become more effective
in the prevention of a global nuclear arms race.
The Congressional proposals for sanctions reform pertained only to
162. But see id. at 197 (noting sanctions are unlikely to meet their intended objectives
within a short amount of time).
163. See India-Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation, supra note 6, at 44-45 (Statement of Karl
F. Inderfurth, Asst. Sec'y of State for South Asian Affairs).
164. See id.
165. See Celia W. Dugger, India and Pakistan Agree Only to Future Talks, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 19, 1998, at A7; Kenneth J. Cooper, Indian-Pakistani Talks End Without Accord,
WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 1998, at A16. India initially maintained that it would not meet
with Pakistan's military dictator until Pakistan ceased sending militants into Kashmir.
India has since attempted to initiate negotiations with a Burmese representative for Paki-
stan, but the parties have yet to meet. See CP Bhambri, Handle US with Care, THE PiO-
NEER (Lucknow, India), Dec. 30, 2000, at 3.
166. In September 1998, Prime Minister Sharif and Prime Minister Vajpayee
announced to the United Nations that both Pakistan and India intended to sign the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), but neither state followed through with the
announcement. See Packer, supra note 3, at 658-59. The United States has also been
accused of taking a hypocritical approach in arguing India and Pakistan must sign the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. See A Delicate Balance, THE STRAITS TIMES (Singapore),
Sept. 3, 2001, available at 2001 WL 26055153.
[W]hat moral standing did the US have to demand that India sign a treaty after
having failed to ratify it itself? Unlike the former Clinton administration, which
pledged to abide by the terms of the CTBT after the Senate voted against its
ratification, the Bush administration has decided to abandon the treaty
altogether.
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future sanctions legislation. 16 7 The bills neither aimed to amend already
existing sanctions policies, nor to address the various goals or objectives of
specific sanctions policies.16 8 Instead, the proposals applied a set of gen-
eral guidelines to all future sanctions legislation, regardless of the specific
circumstances necessitating the sanctions legislation. The Bush Adminis-
tration should continue to push for general reform regarding the enactment
of sanctions legislation, but the Administration should also advocate a
more specific reform of individual, presently existing sanctions legislation.
Rather than enacting one comprehensive sanctions reform bill, the Admin-
istration should develop multiple reform proposals that individually
address and improve presently existing sanctions statutes. 169 Specifically,
the Bush Administration must persuade Congress to individually amend
the Arms Export Control Act.
The India-Pakistan nuclear weapons tests situation illustrates that the
Arms Export Control Act sanctions have a number of problems. First, the
sanctions had a minimal deterrent effect on India's and Pakistan's decision
to acquire nuclear weaponry. 170 Second, once India and Pakistan con-
ducted their nuclear tests, the Arms Export Control Act granted the Presi-
dent little flexibility to negotiate with the new nuclear-weapon states.
Third, the United States had limited international support in its imposition
of anti-proliferation sanctions. Finally, the Arms Export Control Act failed
to stipulate when the sanctions against India and Pakistan would termi-
Id.
167. See The Sanctions Rationalization Act of 1999, S. 927, 106th Cong. (1999); The
Economic Sanctions Reform Act of 1999, S. 1161, 106th Cong. (1999); The Sanctions
Policy Reform Act, S. 757, 106th Cong. (1999); The Enhancement of Trade, Security, &
Human Rights Through Sanctions Reform Act, H.R. 1244, 106th Cong. (1999).
168. See The Sanctions Rationalization Act of 1999, S. 927, 106th Cong. (1999); The
Economic Sanctions Reform Act of 1999, S. 1161, 106th Cong. (1999); The Sanctions
Policy Reform Act, S. 757, 106th Cong. (1999); The Enhancement of Trade, Security, &
Human Rights Through Sanctions Reform Act, H.R. 1244, 106th Cong. (1999).
169. Reforming already-existing sanctions statutes on a case-by-case basis will better
serve the intended goals and objectives of the sanctions legislation. No two sanctions
policies are alike. Hence, already existing sanctions statutes may have different needs
and problem areas. Specific reform legislation will enable Congress to assess the prob-
lem areas of each sanctions statute and base their reform provisions upon such weak-
nesses. Furthermore, only amending the process through which future sanctions
legislation is enacted does not address the problems created by existing legislation. Pro-
spective sanctions reform, for instance, will not resolve future implications with the
Arms Export Control Act because the already existing statute would be immune from
any such proposals.
170. See Economic Sanctions and U.S. Policy Interests, supra note 10, at 94 (statement
of Stuart E. Eizenstat, Under Sec'y of State) ("[tihat both countries [referring to India
and Pakistan] chose to go forward with their decisions to test, knowing full well the
monumental consequences, underscores that ultimately sanctions may not deter nations
from actions that they view ... as fundamental to their national security concerns."); see
also ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, supra note 8, at 199-200 ("[T]hreats
of sanctions appear to have little effect on behavior, especially if the area of concern is of
major importance to the target... India's decision to test nuclear devices in 1998 in the
face of threatened sanctions further reinforces this point.").
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nate. The India-Pakistan Relief Act 17 1 only provided a temporary solution
to the problems with the Arms Export Control Act sanctions, as it only
pertained to the India-Pakistan testing situation.1 72 The Relief Act did not
amend how Arms Export Control Act sanctions would be applied in the
future if other states without nuclear weapons choose to seek and obtain
nuclear weaponry. The following section provides recommendations on
how the Bush Administration should reform the Arms Export Control Act
to make the economic sanctions a more effective tool in preventing the
proliferation of nuclear weapons.
V. Recommendations
A. Demand Greater Use of Import Controls
The United States no longer enjoys the economic power and influence that
it once held. The growth of technology, depreciation of the U.S. dollar,
appreciation of foreign currencies, globalization of markets, and foreign
states' increasing roles in foreign direct investment have impacted U.S. bus-
iness and opened the doors for foreign competition. 173 The United States
still enjoys economic superpower status concerning its trade levels, 174 but
it "increasingly does not have a monopoly" on any good or service. 175
Hence, the inclusion of export controls (which limit the amount of goods
and services target nations can purchase from U.S. businesses) within non-
proliferation sanctions regimes now has greater detrimental effects on U.S.
companies. 176
U.S. companies rely heavily on export sales because they increase
American profits by allowing the manufacturing costs to be spread over a
larger consumer base. 177 The increased profits from these export sales
enable U.S. companies to hire more workers, pay higher wages, and
improve their technology and machinery. 178 Therefore, sanctions that
171. India-Pakistan Relief Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 106-79, Title IX, § 9001, 113 Stat.
1283.
172. See id.
173. See RICHARDSON, supra note 11, at 12 ("US exports have been subject to strong
crosscurrents: rapid appreciation of the dollar, then depreciation; internationalization of
important markets; revolutionary technological change in transportation, telecommuni-
cations, and other sectors; and surging foreign direct investment from Europe, Japan,
and elsewhere.").
174. "The United States is the world's foremost producer and exporter." R. Aylan
Broadbent, U.S. Export Controls on Dual-Use Goods and Technologies: Is the High Tech
Industry Suffering?, 8 CURRENTS INT'L TRADE LJ. 49 (1999).
175. Hearings on Sanctions Reform, supra note 8, at 71 (Statement of Stuart E. Eizen-
stat, Under Sec'y of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs).
176. U.S. economic sanctions against China prohibit U.S. businesses from exporting
products that would be used to develop China's $20 billion nuclear power program. The
President's Export Council estimates that these sanctions may eliminate 225,000 jobs in
twenty-eight states. See THE PRESIDENT'S EXPORT COUNCIL, UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANC-
TIONS: A REVIEW OF ExISTING SANCTIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON U.S. ECONOMIC INTERESTS
WITH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY AND PROCESS IMPROVEMENT 11 (1997).
177. RICHARDSON, supra note 11, at 2.
178. Id.
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place limits on U.S. exports cause long-term profit loss for American com-
panies.179 First, target-state consumers turn to non-American suppliers for
their goods and services. 18 0 The loss of export profits has a detrimental
financial effect on U.S. companies, not only because American businesses
lose out on the profits from the initial sale, but also because they lose out
on profits from the sale of replacement parts, repairs, and support ser-
vices. 18 1 The missed opportunity for future sales can be severely damaging
to American companies because the long-term contracts for replacement
parts and support services typically equal the value of the initial sale.18 2
Second, even if the U.S. sanctions are lifted against the target state, U.S.
businesses have to fight to get their goods and services back into the for-
eign market.18 3 Without U.S. competition, foreign suppliers establish
strong market control and economies of scale within the sanctioned mar-
kets.18 4 Plus, foreign entities become hesitant to enter trade deals with
U.S. companies out of fear that future U.S. sanctions may impact the trans-
actions. 18 5 Many foreign consumers have chosen not to gamble with U.S.
suppliers, since the consumers can get the same goods elsewhere with min-
imal risks of interruption due to sanctions. 186 Foreign businesses take
advantage of the potential sanctions-based restrictions on U.S. companies
179. The Institute for International Economics estimates that economic sanctions
cost the United States between $15 billion and $19 billion in lost exports during 1995.
This estimate, however, does not include $1 billion of lost wages caused by the decrease
in U.S. exports. GARY CLYDE HUEBAUER ET AL, U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: THEIR IMPACT
ON TRADE, JOBS, AND WAGES 6 (Inst. for International Econ. Working Paper, 1997). But
cf. Helms, supra note 14, at 2.
The [claim] ... that sanctions cost the United States vital access to large markets
is a sham. The cost of U.S. sanctions is miniscule. According to . . . the Con-
gressional Budget Office ... the net cost [of existing sanctions] may be less than
$1 billion annually. That compares with $6.6 trillion of total national income in
1997. The United States gave away roughly $13 billion in foreign aid during
1997 . . . [Hence,] [t]he price tag for U.S. economic sanctions comes to a whop-
ping $3.77 per American-about the cost of a Big Mac and fries.
Id.
180. See Smith, supra note 21, at 339-40.
181. Id. at 340-41.
182. See THE PRESIDENT'S EXPORT COUNCIL, supra note 176, at 10.
183. See Hearings on Sanctions Reform, supra note 8, at 76 (Statement of Sen. Joseph R.
Biden).
184. See THE PRESIDENT'S EXPORT COUNCIL, supra note 176, at 10.
185. Smith, supra note 21, at 340.
The ... use of economic sanctions can also give U.S. businesses a reputation for
being unreliable suppliers. That reputation can have a substantial chilling effect
on long-term commercial relationships between U.S. companies and their for-
eign clients, as countries threatened by economic sanctions refuse to purchase
products that incorporate U.S. components out of concern that future sanctions
will limit the availability of spare parts or sophisticated support services.
Id.
186. Airbus Industrie, for example, at one time used only U.S. manufactured engines
for its airplanes, but now the airplane manufacturing company only uses U.S. engines in
approximately one-third of its airplanes. This change not only cost U.S. manufacturers
the initial sale of their engines, but also the potential profits for follow-up repairs and
parts supply. See NAT'L ASS'N MFRS., A CATALOG OF NEW U.S. UNILATERAL ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICY PURPOSES 1993-96, at 10 (1997).
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by promoting their products and services as safer investments than U.S.
offerings because their products and services are not subject to economic
sanctions restrictions.18 7
The high costs on American businesses may exceed the total benefits
received through export control sanctions. However, there are less costly
and more effective ways of imposing economic sanctions on target
states.' 88 Import controls, for instance, often have stronger deterrent
effects on target states, while imposing fewer costs on American busi-
nesses.' 8 9 The Bush Administration must take note of export control sanc-
tions' substantial imposition of costs on American companies and push
Congress to include a greater quantity of import controls within the Arms
Export Control Act sanctions.
Import control sanctions limit the amount of goods and services that
U.S. citizens, government entities, and corporations can purchase from the
sanctions' target state. 190 Instead of prohibiting the target state from
purchasing U.S. products and imposing financial costs upon American
businesses, import sanctions place the financial burden upon the target
state. Placing the full financial burden of non-proliferation sanctions upon
the target state is more logical than forcing American companies to foot the
bill for the target state's decision to acquire nuclear weapons. 191 "Hurting
American jobs because of what India did doesn't make sense .... How
does it deter India and Pakistan from detonating if the punishment they get
is that we lay off American workers? . . . [W]e should be saying, if you
detonate, your products are no longer welcome in this country."192
Import sanctions have a stronger deterrent effect on target nations,
while exposing Americans to fewer financial costs. 19 3 According to Huf-
bauer and Schott's sanctions study, import controls are the most successful
form of economic sanctions.194 Import sanctions often have a stronger
impact on target states than export restrictions because they require com-
panies within the target states to locate new markets in which to profitably
sell their goods and services. 195 Establishing profitable levels of trade
within new markets in response to U.S. import sanctions is usually more
187. "The Port of Vancouver advertises that it, unlike Seattle, is not affected by the
U.S.'s annual renewal of China's Most Favored Nation status. Airbus Industrie similarly
informs Chinese customers that Boeing will not be a reliable supplier of new aircrafts,
supplies, and parts for that same reason." Smith, supra note 21, at 341 n.66.
188. Sanctions can take the form of export controls, reduced aid from U.S. govern-
ment programs, import restrictions, limitations on loans from U.S. private financial
institutions, and the denial of support for loans from international financial institutions.
See ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 11, at 28-29. "Restrictions on
imports and private financial transactions often cost less than export controls, though
all these sanctions have domestic costs." Carter, supra note 15, at 1181.
189. Carter, supra note 15, at 1181.
190. See Mrs. Watu, supra note 16, at 574.
191. See India-Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation, supra note 6, at 26-28 (Statement of
Congressman Donald A. Manzullo).
192. Id.
193. Carter, supra note 15, at 1182.
194. See ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 11, at 89.
195. Carter, supra note 15, at 1181.
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difficult and costly for target states than finding new non-American suppli-
ers when adjusting to U.S. export sanctions. 196 Because import controls
make it more difficult and financially burdensome for target states to
adjust to the U.S. sanctions, import controls are more likely to succeed. 19 7
Moreover, although the target state may respond with counter-sanctions
and prohibit all trade in its nation with American suppliers, import sanc-
tions are not likely to cause American businesses a significant loss of
sales. 198 Import controls do not have a significant impact on U.S. consum-
ers, because American purchasers are usually able to acquire sanctioned
products from a number of other suppliers. 199 American consumers may
have to pay more to purchase substitutes for sanctioned products, but the
additional cost to each individual consumer is not likely to be substan-
tial. 20 0 Hence, the benefits of import controls are more likely than export-
based sanctions to outweigh their costs to American businesses and
consumers.
20 1
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and World Trade
Organization (WTO) free trade requirements likely do not foreclose the
United States from using import controls in its Arms Export Control Act
non-proliferation sanctions. 20 2 Although the GATT/WTO prohibits mem-
ber states from restricting free trade or discriminating against other mem-
ber states' goods and services, these free trade requirements are likely to be
inapplicable to U.S. non-proliferation sanctions. 20 3 First, the GATT/WTO
exempts member states from fulfilling the free trade requirements in their
trade relations with non-member states. Hence, the United States may
freely impose non-proliferation sanctions against any nonmember state.
Second, the GATT/WTO contains many broad exceptions to the free trade
196. See SHAMBAUGH, supra note 35, at 22.
197. See ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 11, at 83 ("[C]ountries in
distress or experiencing significant [political or economic] problems are far more likely
to succumb to the policy objectives of the sender country.").
198. See Carter, supra note 15, at 1182.
199. Id.; cf. Mrs. Watu, supra note 16, at 575 ("[Blanning [the] importation of target
products, ought to enrage American consumers ... assuming no acceptable substitutes
exist.").
200. See Carter, supra note 15, at 1181 ("While these customers will then bear some
of the costs, their individual burden will probably be a small share of the total domestic
costs of import sanctions, because the costs may be spread among many purchasers at
different levels of the distribution process.").
201. Hufbauer and Schott note that "[t]he more it costs a sender country to impose
sanctions, the less likely it is that the sanctions will succeed .... [A] country should shy
away from deploying sanctions when the economic costs to itself are high." ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 11, at 88. Hence, the high costs of export-based
sanctions on American businesses make them less likely to succeed than other forms of
sanctions, such as import-controls, that have lower economic costs.
202. The President "has authority under the WTO and emergency economic powers
to impose import constraints for national security reasons." India-Pakistan Nuclear
Proliferation, supra note 6, at 27 (Statement of David Aaron, Under Sec'y of State for Int'l
Trade).
203. See Smith, supra note 21, at 363 ("[lIt is clear that GATT and GATS, and multilat-
eral trade agreements in general, do not present a realistic means for controlling the
U.S.'s excessive sanctions policy.").
Cornell International Law Journal
requirements. Article XX exempts member states from GATT trade require-
ments when trade restrictions are necessary to protect human, animal, or
plant life. 20 4 Thus, member states may impose economic sanctions aimed
at the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons because the proliferation of
weapons poses danger to human, animal, and plant life. 20 5 Article XXI
also provides an exception to the GATT requirements, permitting a mem-
ber state to impose trade restrictions when that state considers such action
"necessary for the protection of its essential security interests, relating to
fissionable materials . . . [or] the traffics in arms."20 6 Hence, member
states may invoke the Article XXI national security exemption to impose
non-proliferation sanctions. Otherwise, "[i]f a sanctioning member had to
wait until a hostile power acquires nuclear weapons ... it would be too late
for trade sanctions to have any protective effect."' 20 7 Therefore, the WTO/
GATT is unlikely to prohibit the United States from using import controls
within its Arms Export Control Act anti-proliferation sanctions.
The Arms Export Control Act forbids the sale of items or services that
could be used for the proliferation of nuclear weapons, prohibits U.S. trade
with government entities that are affiliated with their nation's military
operations or nuclear programs, and denies U.S. government financial
assistance to trade promotion programs.20 8 Hence, the anti-proliferation
statute imposes U.S. export restrictions only on nuclear weapons materials
and all products requested by military entities affiliated with the target
state's nuclear tests. Even when limited to specific goods and services,
however, export-based sanctions can impose high costs on American com-
panies and workers. Import control sanctions, on the other hand, have
been shown to be less costly and more effective in achieving the sanctions'
intended goals. The Bush Administration should therefore push Congress
to amend the Arms Export Control Act sanctions to include the imposition
of import controls against any state that chooses to seek and acquire
nuclear weapons.
B. Procedural Revisions for the Arms Export Control Act Sanctions
1. Require the President to First Seek International Cooperation Before
Imposing the Sanctions
Approximately twelve states coordinated their efforts with the United
States to impose sanctions against India and Pakistan for their nuclear
204. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
205. See Smith, supra note 21, at 364.
206. FINAL ACT EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, MARRAKESH, 15 APRIL 1994 (1994), reprinted in 33 ILM 1144,
1154, 1168, 1197 (1994).
207. Raj Bhala, National Security and International Trade Law: What the GATT Says,
and What the United States Does, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 263, 274-75 (1998).
208. See Arms Export Control Act of 1978 § 102, 22 U.S.C.S. 2799aa-1 (2000).
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weapons tests.20 9 Most of the sanctions imposed by the twelve states con-
sisted of foreign aid denials. 210 The United States, on the other hand,
issued numerous sanctions, including foreign aid restrictions, export con-
trols, private loan denials, and international financial institutional loan
opposition.211 Although any form of international assistance typically
enhances the strength of economic sanctions, the Arms Export Control Act
should require the President to seek stronger international support for the
U.S. imposition of anti-proliferation sanctions. President Bush should
therefore encourage Congress to include a provision within the Arms
Export Control Act that requires the President to seek maximum interna-
tional support before imposing anti-proliferation sanctions against states
that acquire nuclear weaponry. 212
Greater multilateral support would strengthen the Arms Export Con-
trol Act sanctions' goal of coercing the new nuclear-weapon states into
adopting test bans and disarmament treaties. First, multilateral sanctions,
or sanctions that are cooperatively imposed against a target state by multi-
ple nations, typically communicate more forceful messages, and expose the
target state to greater amounts of pressure.213 Hence, multilateral anti-
proliferation sanctions inform the target state that the international com-
munity strongly disagrees with its decision to test nuclear weapons. 21 4
Second, multilateral sanctions fulfill their intended objectives more often
than unilateral sanctions. 215 When multiple nations participate in the
imposition of an anti-proliferation sanctions regime, it becomes increas-
209. "[T]he steps that have been taken by other countries[, however] are nowhere
near as comprehensive as the [U.S. sanctions]." India-Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation,
supra note 6, at 34 (Statement of David Aaron, Under Sec'y of Commerce for Int'l Trade).
210. Canada and Australia, for example, cut non-humanitarian assistance and can-
celed all military sales to both states. Norway froze bilateral aid and vowed to grant no
new export credits. Japan cancelled $30 million of financial development grants. Id. at
34.
211. See Arms Export Control Act of 1978 § 102, 22 U.S.C.S. 2799aa-1 (2000).
212. The Clinton Administration urged Congress to include a multilateral support
provision within any future sanctions reform legislation. See Hearings on Sanctions
Reform, supra note 8, at 60 (Statement of Stuart E. Eizenstat, Under Sec'y of State for
Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs).
213. See Hearings on Sanctions Reform, supra note 8, at 60 (Statement of Stuart E.
Eizenstat, Under Sec'y of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs); Eco-
NOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 11, at 90 ("[]nternational cooperation
serves three useful functions: it increases the moral suasion of the sanction; it helps
isolate the target country from the global community; and it preempts foreign backlash,
thus minimizing corrosive friction within the alliance.").
214. A multi-parties sanctions regime against the acquisition and testing of nuclear
weapons would also promote the formation of an international custom against con-
ducting nuclear weapons test. Stated another way, when multiple states voice their com-
plaints against nuclear weapons tests, they at least prevent the acquisition and testing of
nuclear weapons from becoming an acceptable customary norm.
215. See ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, supra note 8, at 200. But see
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 11, at 89-90 ("Contrary to conventional
wisdom, multilateral sanctions are not frequently associated with success .... Sanc-
tions should be either deployed unilaterally-because the impact on one's allies is slight
- or they should be designed in cooperation with one's allies in order to reduce back-
lash and evasion.").
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ingly more difficult for the target state to avoid the full impact of the sanc-
tions by finding new trade partners. Plus, multilateral sanctions cost less
to implement than unilateral sanctions because numerous states share in
the imposition costs. Multilateral non-proliferation sanctions would there-
fore reduce the heavy burden of the Arms Export Control Act sanctions on
American businesses. 216
2. Provide the President with Waiver Authority
The Arms Export Control Act sanctions leave the President with little flexi-
bility.217 The statute provides minimal presidential waiver authority. 218
Even where the statute does allow a presidential waiver, it limits the Presi-
dent's waiver authority to situations where implementing the sanctions
"would have a serious adverse effect on vital United States interests... [or]
would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States non-
proliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and
security."219 The Bush Administration should urge Congress to create a
Presidential waiver provision within the Arms Export Control Act. Greater
waiver authority would provide the President with the freedom to adjust
the anti-proliferation sanctions and respond to the unique circumstances
surrounding the nuclear weapons tests. Congress could limit this Presi-
dential power and remain active regarding the U.S. sanctions by creating an
override provision.220 Hence, if Congress disagrees with the President's
waiver, it could override the President's decision by attaining a majority
vote in both houses of Congress.
Providing the President with greater waiver authority would improve
both goals of the Arms Export Control Act sanctions. 221 First, creating
broader presidential waiver authority would strengthen the statute's deter-
rent effect. As it exists currently, the Arms Export Control Act demands
216. See Hearings on Sanctions Reform, supra note 8, at 60 (Statement of Stuart E.
Eizenstat, Under Sec'y of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs).
217. The India-Relief Act did provide President Clinton with greater waiver authority.
Such expansion of power, however, does not resolve the rigid limitations of the Arms
Export Control Act, however, because the India-Relief Act pertains only to the India-
Pakistan testing situation. It does not amend how the Arms Export Control Act will be
applied in the future. See India-Pakistan Relief Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 106-79, Title IX,
§ 9001, 113 Stat. 1283.
218. No waiver authority, for instance, is provided to the President for sanctions
regarding the opposition to international financial institutional loans. Mrs. Watu, supra
note 16, at 580-81.
219. Id. (citing Arms Export Control Act of 1978 § 102, 22 U.S.C.S. 2799aa-1
(2000)).
220. See Agricultural Sanctions, supra note 95, at 64 (Statement by Stuart E. Eizenstat,
Under Sec'y of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs).
221. See ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, supra note 8, at 209 ("Cur-
rent legislation that mandates sanctions in specific circumstances should be repealed or
modified."). But cf. Mrs. Watu, supra note 16, at 585.
[I]n spite of any statutory requirement incumbent on the President to report the
basis for his or her exercise of waiver authority, the decision-making process
and the real grounds for the waiver granted may not be transparent .... Why
offer publicly anything more than a pithy, conclusory explanation that meets
just the minimum statutory threshold for reporting to Congress?
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the full and immediate imposition of economic sanctions with little room
for exceptions.222 Its rigid demands and inflexible requirements make it
highly likely, as illustrated by the India-Pakistan Relief Act,2 23 that Con-
gress will eventually amend the statute to better fit the sanctions to the
circumstances and needs of the nuclear testing situation.224 Such statu-
tory change is often counterproductive to the deterrence aspect of the non-
proliferation sanctions, because it sends the message to non-nuclear states
that the sanctions will not be as bad as they originally seem. It leads
nuclear-weapon aspirants to believe that the United States will amend the
heavy economic sanctions after the states acquire nuclear weapons.
Amending the statute now and providing the President with greater waiver
authority will make the Arms Export Control Act more flexible and realis-
tic. Foreign governments will be less certain that the United States will
reduce the sanctions. Plus, expanding the President's waiver authority will
make the anti-proliferations statute less extreme, improving the United
States' credibility in its threat of heavy economic sanctions.
Second, broader waiver authority would provide the President with
greater negotiation leverage with new nuclear-weapons states, making it
more likely that the United States will be able to push the violating states
into adopting test bans and disarmament procedures. The President must
not be restricted in his ability to quickly react to emergency international
situations like nuclear weapons testing.225 By reducing the Arms Export
Control Act's rigid requirements, the President will regain bargaining
power with new nuclear-weapon states. The President will be better able to
craft a specific response to the proliferation crisis and work directly with
the new nuclear weapons states to persuade them to commit to test bans
and non-proliferation treaties.
Congress must use caution in deciding upon the exact waiver author-
ity terminology. The Clinton Administration suggested the adoption of a
national interest waiver in all future sanctions legislation. 226 Such waiver
authority would permit the President to refrain from imposing and termi-
Id.
222. See Arms Export Control Act of 1978 § 102, 22 U.S.C.S. 2799aa-1 (2000).
223. India-Pakistan Relief Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 106-79, Title IX, § 9001, 113 Stat.
1283.
224. Mrs. Watu, supra note 16, at 582-83 ("If the Relief Act illustrates a broader pro-
position about the [Clinton] Administration's sanctions 'policy,' it is that it seems quite
content to impose ostensibly tough sanctions up front, and soon thereafter back off,
hence undermining the long-term credibility of the sanctions.").
225. See ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, supra note 8, at 209.
Beyond being consistent with the Constitution's bias in favor of executive pri-
macy in the exercise of the foreign affairs power, such latitude is needed if rela-
tionships are not to become hostage to one interest and if the executive is to have
the flexibility needed to explore whether the introduction of limited incentives
can bring about a desired policy end.
Id.
226. Hearings on Sanctions Reform, supra note 8, at 66 (Statement of Stuart E. Eizen-
stat, Under Sec'y of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs).
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nate any sanction that threatens a national interest of the United States.227
While a national interest waiver would provide the President with greater
flexibility, it may be too much flexibility. "National interest" is too broad a
term; anything could qualify as a national interest. Such a broad rule
opens the possibility for extensive debate as to when a national interest
requirement will be satisfied. 228 At the same time, an overly specific rule,
such that the President may not waive economic sanctions against the tar-
get state for thirty-five days after the initial testing, may be too narrow and
defeat the goal. of providing the President with greater flexibility.
3. Require Annual Review and Report Termination Provisions
The Arms Export Control Act fails to specify a termination procedure for
its sanctions. This lack of a specific termination provision means that once
the President imposes the sanctions, they remain in place until Congress
enacts a joint resolution in favor of their termination. 229 A joint resolution
requirement can be problematic, as Congress typically struggles to estab-
lish the majority vote necessary to terminate the sanctions.230 Thus, the
sanctions remain in place for an extended period of time, slowly losing
their effectiveness. 231 The emotional impact surrounding the initial
nuclear weapons issue that led to their imposition begins to fade, multilat-
eral support for the sanctions declines once the imposition costs rise, and
the target state often averts the full impact of the sanctions by locating new
trade partners. 232 Eventually, the costs of the anti-proliferation sanctions
greatly outweigh any perceived benefits. The Bush Administration must
address the sanctions fatigue syndrome by including annual review and
report termination clauses within its Arms Export Control Act reform
proposals.
The proposed Sanctions Policy Reform Act233 and Sanctions Enhance-
ment Act 2 3 4 bills propose that all future economic sanctions legislation
contain a two-year expiration provision, meaning the sanctions would auto-
matically terminate two years after their date of implementation unless fur-
ther renewed by Congress or the President. 235 While an automatic
227. Id. at 60 (statement of Stuart E. Eizenstat, Under Sec'y of State for Economic,
Business, and Agricultural Affairs).
228. Mrs. Watu, supra note 16, at 585.
229. Id. at 581.
230. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, supra note 8, at 205 ("[lIt is
often difficult or impossible to build consensus for rescinding the sanctions, even if
there has been some progress on the matter of concern, if the sanctions have been show-
ing to be feckless or counterproductive, or if other interests can be shown to suffer as a
result.").
231. id.
232. See id.
233. The Sanctions Policy Reform Act, S. 757, 106th Cong. (1999).
234. The Enhancement of Trade, Security, & Human Rights Through Sanctions
Reform Act, H.R. 1244, 106th Cong. (1999).
235. The Sanctions Policy Reform Act, S. 757, 106th Cong. (1999); The Enhancement
of Trade, Security, & Human Rights Through Sanctions Reform Act, H.R. 1244, 106th
Cong. (1999).
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termination provision may address sanctions' diminishing returns prob-
lem, it would not promote the Arms Export Control Act's long-term goal of
deterrence. Knowing that the sanctions will only last two years, foreign
governments may be more willing to acquire nuclear weapons and ride out
the two-year anti-proliferation sanctions.23 6 The foreign governments
could further minimize the impact of the two-year sanctions by stockpiling
goods and developing new trade partners in advance of their nuclear test-
ing. A pre-determined termination date could be helpful, but the decision
whether to terminate anti-proliferation sanctions should instead be based
on the sanctions' overall effectiveness in achieving their goals. 23 7
President Bush should instead adopt the Clinton Administration's rec-
ommendation that Congress require annual Presidential reviews of
existing sanctions.2 38 Every year the President would analyze ongoing
sanctions to determine whether the sanctions serve their intended func-
tions, assess whether the sanctions create excessive costs on American
businesses, and examine whether the sanctions trigger unintended nega-
tive consequences. 239 The Arms Export Control Act could further require
the President to seek reports on the sanctions from the Secretary of Agri-
culture, Congressional Budget Office, and International Trade Commis-
sion.240 After reviewing the existing sanctions, the President would then
issue a report to Congress, outlining his or her decision to terminate or
continue the anti-proliferation sanctions. 24 1
236. Hearings on Sanctions Reform, supra note 8, at 66 (statement of Stuart E. Eizen-
stat, Under Sec'y of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs). But cf. Gib-
son, supra note 41, at 240-41 (1999) (arguing sanctions with pre-determined time limits
would cause less suffering, but communicate a stronger message by not providing the
target state enough time to evade the sanctions).
237. See Agricultural Sanctions, supra note 95, at 67 (statement of Stuart E. Eizenstat,
Under Sec'y of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs).
238. Id.
239. The Presidential report,
should include an assessment of the extent to which the sanction had served its
purposes; the economic, political, and/or military impact on the target; the
humanitarian effect on the population of the target country; the reactions of the
target country; the degree of international compliance and noncompliance; the
financial costs to U.S. businesses, workers, and the government; and any other
perceived costs and benefits of any sort ... to the United States.
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, supra note 8, at 210. The President
must be confident the sanctions in question can attain their goals, "impose sufficient
economic pain to command the attention of the target country ... and ... not impose
insupportable costs on . .. [U.S.] domestic constituents and foreign allies." ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 11, at 91.
240. See Agricultural Sanctions, supra note 95, at 67 (statement of Stuart E. Eizenstat,
Under Sec'y of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs).
241. See Hearings on Sanctions Reform, supra note 8, at 62 (statement of Stuart E.
Eizenstat, Under Sec'y of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs); Sanc-
tions Policy Reform Act, S. 757, 106th Cong. (1999); ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND AMERI-
CAN DIPLOMACY, supra note 8, at 210-11 ("An annual report along these lines ... would
introduce much-needed rigor into the sanctions decision-making process.").
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Conclusion
The Arms Export Control Act anti-proliferation sanctions ineffectively
serve their goals. The sanctions failed both to deter India and Pakistan
from acquiring nuclear weapons and to encourage them to sign disarma-
ment treaties. To address these statutory weaknesses and anti-proliferation
failures, the Bush Administration must reinitiate the U.S. sanctions reform
movement and specifically demand Congressional reform of the Arms
Export Control Act. President Bush must urge Congress to amend the anti-
proliferation statute to include import controls, Presidential waivers, and
annual review and report termination provisions.
